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Abstract
Seeing Human Geography as a nexus of temporally oscillating concepts, this paper investigates the 
dissemination of scientific ideas with a focus on extra-scientific factors. While scientific progress is usually 
evaluated in terms of intellectual achievement of the individual researcher, geographers tend to forget about 
the external factors that tacitly yet critically contribute to knowledge production. While these externalities are 
well-documented in the natural sciences, social sciences have not yet seen comparable scrutiny. Using Torsten 
Hägerstrand’s rise to prominence as a concrete example, we explore this perspective in a social-science case – 
Human Geography. Applying an STS (Science and Technology Studies) approach, we depart from a model 
of science as socially-materially contingent, with special focus on three extra-scientific factors: community 
norms, materiality and the political climate. These factors are all important in order for knowledge to be 
disseminated into the hinterland of Human Geography. We conclude it is these types of conditions that in 
practice escape the relativism of representation.
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1. Introduction
Human Geography is replete with concepts. Seen as 
constituents of thoughts – either as mental representations 
(cf. Locke, [1690] 1975; Hume, [1739] 1978), abilities 
(cf. Wittgenstein, 1953) or so-called Fregean senses (cf. 
Peacocke, 1992) – concepts are crucial for most psychological 
processes, including categorisation, inference and decision 
making. While psychological processes both affect and reflect 
the multiple ways we engage with the world (Pinker, 2007; 
Dymitrow and Brauer, 2016; Dymitrow et al., 2017), it is 
often forsaken that science – seen as a construct of the 
human mind – is an inseparable part of this reciprocity 
(cf. Fleck, [1936] 1986). Since concepts, as Margolis and 
Lawrence (1999, p. 1) put it “often reflect deeply opposing 
approaches to the study of the mind, to language, and even to 
philosophy itself”, scientific conceptual advancement, then, 
is unlikely to be obtained merely by means of intellectual 
consensus (Dymitrow and Brauer, forthcoming). Let us 
consider the circumstances.
New concepts and ideas are introduced into science 
constantly. Some ideas become popular while others fall 
out of favour; this is part of the natural progression of any 
growing academic field. It is not only the academic merit of 
competing concepts, however, or their internal validity that 
decides if these will be incorporated or abandoned (Johnston 
and Claval, 1984; Latour, 1993; Shapin, 2010). Classical 
philosophy of science and the idea of a disinterested academia 
may suggest this, but from 50 years of critical sociological 
studies of ‘science in action’ we know that this is not the 
case (Sismondo, 2011; 2012). Sociologically identified factors 
influencing the progression of science are: community 
norms (e.g. Merton, 1973; Mitroff, 1974; Shapin, 1982), 
material factors (e.g. Collins, 1981; Latour, 2005; Bennett 
and Joyce, 2013), and the wider political climate (e.g. 
Haraway, 1991; Edwards, 1997; Livingstone, 2010), to 
mention but a few. The overwhelming majority of classical 
sociological studies, however, have focused on the traditional 
scientific disciplines, such as physics, mathematics or 
biology (e.g. Shapin et al., 1985; Bloor, 1991; Collins and 
Pinch, 1993; Chalmers, 2013). Conversely, the social sciences 
have not yet seen a similar level of scrutiny, although this 
is slowly changing (e.g. MacKenzie, 2009; Lamont, 2009; 
Camic et al., 2012). Understanding scientific process as a 
human pursuit for knowledge, it is fair to assume that the 
social sciences – including Human Geography – operate in 
a similar fashion (e.g. Barnes, 2001; Law, 2004; Cloke and 
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1 The difference between reconstruction and construction lies primarily in the methodological choices regarding how historical 
facts are used (cf. Phillips, 2012, p. 27).
2 The data material for this study represents autobiographical and biographical accounts, eulogies, Festschrifts, Hägerstrand’s 
original works and historical documents – to mention only a few. See the references for a full list.
3 Hägerstrand himself sees time in a similar fashion. He makes a distinction between the actual manifestation of time (the life 
path) as opposed to all potential possibilities (the space-time prism) (Hägerstrand et al., 2009, pp. 218–224). Here, we are 
primarily interested in the potential aspect of ‘how it could have gone otherwise’, as this is what we refer to when invoking an 
underdetermined timeline.
Johnston, 2005; Johnston and Sidaway, 2015). This paper 
sets out to investigate these particularities of knowledge 
production within a social science context, to further 
investigate the validity of this assumption.
To achieve that, we depart from Law’s (2004) model of 
how research/science operates on a sociological level. We 
apply this model to a specific social science case: the case 
of Torsten Hägerstrand and his concept of time geography. 
Time geography and Hägerstrand’s life lend themselves 
well to this type of analysis, because Hägerstrand’s rise 
to fame was not a smooth, straight-forward progression 
as the majority of accounts that discuss the life path 
of Hägerstrand might suggest (cf. Duncan, 1974; 
Hägerstrand, 1983; Sollbe, 1991; Morrill, 2005; Pred, 2005; 
Öberg, 2005; Buttimer and Mels, 2006; Buttimer, 2007; 
Lenntorp,  2008;  Persson  and  Elleg�rd,  2012;  Elleg�rd 
and Svedin, 2012). It hence represents a good starting 
point for a Science and Technology Studies (STS) type of 
analysis, which commonly departs from controversy or 
failed projects (e.g. Law, 1992; Latour and Porter, 1996; 
Venturini, 2010).
STS is an offspring of science studies, which investigates 
how social, political and cultural values affect scientific 
research and technological innovation, and how these, 
in turn, affect the interconnected network of society, 
politics and culture (Latour, 1987). STS departs from a 
socio-constructivist view of knowledge production, which 
epistemologically shifts the definition of how science 
works from philosophy to sociology (Latour et al., 2011). 
An STS approach views science as a process that 
“teach[es] fallibility, not absolute truth […], recognising 
the provisional character of all [scientific] knowledge” 
(Edwards, 2010, p. 438). This ‘provisional character’ 
applies to ‘knowledge about knowledge’ as well, limiting 
in this sense its predictive capabilities (Collins and Evans, 
2008, p. 140). Since most STS knowledge was produced 
within a natural science setting, the question remains how 
applicable is this understanding within a social science 
context – or, here, in Human Geography?
2. How to study social science sociologically
In order to address this question, we depart from our 
interpretation of Law’s (2004) sociological model of how 
(social) science research is created and validated within 
a specific discipline. We are interested in investigating 
community norms, material factors and the wider political 
climate surrounding the inception of Hägerstrand’s ideas, 
as these all have been identified as important factors 
behind knowledge production within the natural sciences. 
Hägerstrand is known for his ‘seminal’ and ‘highly 
innovative’ work on migration, cultural diffusion and time 
geography, while also being a major figure within Human 
Geography (cf. Lenntorp, 2008). Hägerstrand’s academic 
profile offers a research-friendly context for examining 
social science in the making – from obscurity to worldwide 
recognition. At this point, a word on scope is in place. 
Although we do engage with Hägerstrand’s life and time 
on a minute level, neither Torsten Hägerstrand nor the 
development of time geography are the focal point of our 
analysis. Rather, by using different socio-material dimensions 
of his recognition and rise to fame as the analytical foci for 
our study, we dare to extrapolate his case to any conceptual 
advancement in Human Geography (and in social sciences at 
large) where recognition and popularity can be historically 
attributed to extra-scientific factors (which – we argue – 
almost always is the case). Furthermore, accounts of the 
life path of Hägerstrand often take a romanticising view 
of Hägerstrand on the circumstances of his recognition. 
Such accounts usually focus on his contributions and not on 
the circumstances of his recognition (e.g. Helmfrid, 2005). 
In other words, the aim of this paper is to determine the 
specifics of the knowledge dissemination process within 
a social science context, using an STS perspective (cf. 
Latour, 1999, pp. 25– 79), and add to the literature of how 
Hägerstrand was recognised for his ideas.
The principal method in our analysis is an historical 
deconstruction of Hägerstrand’s path towards recognition 
in the style of seminal STS, used to study the natural 
sciences in action (cf. Latour, 1987; Shapin et al., 1985; 
Bloor, 1991). This approach stems from the postmodernist 
critique of historic representation and is often used 
as an alternative method to explore the conventional 
history of science (cf. Schuster, 1995; Jardine, 2003; 
Phillips, 2012). Munslow (2006) distinguishes between the 
reconstruction, construction and deconstruction of historic 
accounts. A historical reconstruction and construction 
epistemologically treat the past as static, implying that 
their form of representation is an accurate account of the 
transpired events1. Deconstruction, on the other hand, 
differs epistemologically in that the past is conceptualised 
as continuous event or as “the process of making history” 
(Munslow, 2006, p. 75). The historical deconstruction 
implied here aims to outline the external conditions for an 
historic event to take place in the first place, because “[…] it 
is only by doing this that we challenge the belief that there 
is a discoverable and accurate representable truthfulness in 
the reality of the past” (Munslow, 2006, p. 4).
Having employed a detailed content analysis of relevant 
accounts relating to the life and times of Hägerstrand2, in 
line with the principles of historical deconstruction, we have 
followed the central methodological provocation of STS 
research, namely that “it could be otherwise” (Woolgar and 
Lezaun, 2013, p. 43). Such an approach re-introduces the 
‘messiness’ of creation back into the analysis, as opposed 
to a ‘smooth’ historical reconstruction (Collins, 1981; 
Latour, 1999; Law, 2004; Brauer et al., 2016). Primarily, this 
establishes an undetermined timeline3, without inherent 
directionality, undetermined in the sense that many different 
potential timelines could have arisen at any particular point 
in time. Methodologically, such an approach is very liberal 
in terms of guidelines; it is the data material that ‘decides’ 
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4 We have used the term ‘controversy’ given that the cited literature regards the time lag of his recognition and incorporation 
into the geographic hinterland as an eventuality rather than a process. This is also the reason for choosing to put quotation 
marks around the word ‘belated’ in the title, given that the main line of our argument is to establish that there was nothing 
inevitable about this incorporation into the hinterland of Human Geography. Rather, it was a combination of Hägerstrand’s 
own effort and external forces, the latter being the primary focus of this article.
where the investigation will proceed, not the researcher. 
Venturini (2010, p. 260) summarises this approach in three 
methodological ‘commandments’:
1. “you shall not restrain your observation to any single 
theory or methodology;
2. you shall observe from as many viewpoints as possible;
3. you shall listen to actors’ voices more than to your own 
presumptions”.
We interpret these methodological commandments 
as follows. First, although we introduce a theoretical 
model of science (see the following section), this model 
is merely used as an analytical starting point, as we are 
“aware of the need to avoid any methodological strait-
jacketing and remain open and creative in our thinking” 
(Tribe and Liburd, 2016, p. 45). Second, we ‘follow’ (cf. 
Latour and Porter, 1996, p. 204) Hägerstrand’s trail 
wherever it may lead us, which means that the employed 
historical deconstruction accounts for as many viewpoints 
on Hägerstrand’s life as possible. Lastly, we place the 
encountered actors’ voices above our ‘own presumptions’ 
in line with a ‘hierarchy of credibility’ among the different 
individuals and accounts involved. In other words, the 
closer a source to Hägerstrand and the time in question, 
the more credibility it attains (cf. Shapin et al., 1985). This 
also means that our own preconceived notions place last, 
while Hägerstrand’s own biographical account supersedes 
secondary accounts of his life. We begin our investigation 
by introducing the aforementioned model of science used 
as the basis for our analysis.
3. A sociological model of science
If science is not an abstract, disinterested pursuit of 
knowledge, then how does it work? The implication from 
the sociological scrutiny of science is that it essentially 
represents a human endeavour. In this sense it may be 
instructive to think of research using an economic metaphor 
of the classical science canon ‘nanos gigantum humeris 
insidentes’, as so eloquently expressed by Isaac Newton 
(translation: we are dwarfs standing on the shoulders of 
giants). The giants, however, are not passive: they represent 
powerful allies (cf. Shapin et al., 1985; Latour, 1987; 
Latour, 1988). The cost involved in the unmaking of a 
newly-created theory (proposition + alliances) conditions 
if a proposition is accepted as true or false, criticised or 
praised (Fleck, [1936] 1986; Latour and Woolgar, 1979; 
Law, 2004). The more alliances can be mobilised, the harder 
it becomes to defeat the newly-created proposition. Once 
enough allies are mobilised, a proposition becomes accepted 
as true (Latour et al., 2011).
Figure 1 is a visualisation of the process of transformation 
that every research project goes through, i.e. the making of 
science. Initially, a research focus needs to be established. 
This is achieved by drawing inspiration from previously 
established knowledge, the so-called hinterland (box 1 in 
Fig. 1). This allows for the identification of ontological 
categories, i.e. a system of ‘created truth’, agreed upon 
by way of methodological practices in line with the 
scientific standards of a particular hinterland (box 2 in 
Fig. 1). Ontological transformation hence reduces an 
overwhelmingly complex reality into an understandable and 
manageable size by removing and filtering out redundant 
(‘unwanted’) data. Epistemological transformation is 
achieved by agreeing upon a process of how knowledge is 
accumulated and structured, i.e. how claims of truth can be 
distinguished from false ones according to the established 
standards. Methodological transformation, which generates 
data and offers hints to potential correlations, isolates 
relevant information in line with procedures established 
within the methodological hinterland. The outcome of 
these three types of transformation (box 3 in Fig. 1) renders 
a theoretical idealisation of the observed reality, which 
subsequently becomes a simplified representation of that 
reality in correspondence to the established hinterland. As 
these simplified representations ultimately influence new 
studies, the whole process is infinitely repeated.
This model, however, runs into problems of representation, 
because previous knowledge (upon which its construction 
was based) inherently influences how reality is to be 
interpreted for every new study. As a consequence, STS 
researchers have called this dilemma the multiple reality 
assumption (cf. Mol, 2002). This interpretation is at odds 
with the conventional assumption – for example within 
multi-method research – that the more different approaches 
are implemented to solve a problem, the better our 
understanding of it. Instead, the multiple reality assumption 
implies that depending on what research is chosen to serve 
as an alliance, a new interpretation of the same reality is 
created (see Fig. 2). On a theoretical level, this gives rise to the 
inescapable relativism of ideas that has laid the foundation 
for much criticism towards classical definitions of science, 
which cannot circumvent this impasse philosophically 
(Kuhn, 1970; Feyerabend, 1988; Sismondo, 2012). The 
practical consequence of this contingency is that scholars 
can be referring to the same object, which nonetheless is 
conceptualised differently depending upon what parts of the 
hinterland the chosen approach departs from (cf. Mol, 2002; 
Law, 2004). The particularities of sociological knowledge 
production as outlined by STS scholars emphasise the 
process of science, i.e. the praxis of doing science. The 
implication is that although, philosophically, consolidation 
of contradicting knowledge claims cannot be achieved, in 
actual praxis it is possible (cf. Collins and Evans, 2002). 
STS-scholars usually identify extra-scientific factors as 
being important to escape the relativism implied by the 
multiple reality assumption by materially reinforcing and 
fixing one particular interpretation (Law and Urry, 2004; 
Latour, 2005; Mol, 2010).
Here, we want to focus upon those aspects of science 
that shape this outcome within a social science context. 
For the sake of clarity of argument, we limit our analysis 
to three factors: community norms, material factors and 
the political climate, and how they correspond to the case 
of Torsten Hägerstrand. Before we begin our analysis, 
however, we need to briefly introduce our protagonist and 
the ‘controversy’4 surrounding his recognition – this section 
also reflects the common representations of his life, from 
which our historical deconstruction will depart.
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4. Torsten Hägerstrand and his ‘belated’  
recognition
Torsten Hägerstrand (1916–2004) is considered one 
of the most prominent figures in Human Geography of 
the last century (Johnston, 2007), having significant 
impact on the discipline itself and public planning, both 
in Sweden and internationally (Öberg, 2005). He received 
many decorations in recognition for his contributions 
and Pred (2005) called him a ‘giant of the discipline’. 
In 2016, as geographical communities throughout the 
world commemorated the 100th anniversary of his birth, 
Hägerstrand continues to be referred to as “one of the 
most celebrated Nordic social scientists of the 20th century 
[who] has greatly influenced the development of a broad 
range of research areas” (University of Stockholm, 2016). 
Hägerstrand is most famous for his work on the diffusion 
of ideas and as the founding father of time geography 
(Persson  and  Elleg�rd,  2012).  Concepts  of  his  time 
geography were formally introduced to the wider English-
speaking audience in his 1970 article: ‘What about people 
in regional science?’ (Hägerstrand, 1970). Moreover, he 
kept developing and refining his theory of time geography 
his entire life (cf. Hägerstrand et al., 2009). Hägerstrand 
was also involved in public planning, partly because his 
early work was largely ignored within Human Geography. 
A great number of works have been written in appraisal 
of his intellectual legacy (Hägerstrand, 1983; Sollbe, 1991; 
Öberg, 2005; Morrill, 2005; Pred, 2005; Buttimer and 
Fig. 1: A sociological model of research. Source: authors’ re-interpretation of Law (2004)
Fig. 2: An illustration of the consequences of a multiple-reality assumption for scientific representation. The same 
situation is being transformed into different representations of reality, depending upon a particular approach 
chosen. The different colours represent different ontological, methodological or epistemological approaches 
(see Fig. 1 for how this process unfolds). Source: authors’ re-interpretation of Mol (2002)
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Mels, 2006; Buttimer, 2007; Lenntorp, 2008; Persson and 
Elleg�rd, 2012). What these works usually argue, however, 
is that the conceptual roots of time geography were to be 
found in his early writings, like his doctoral thesis, and 
that his recognition was primarily due to his own actions. 
Nevertheless, it took almost seven more years for his 
ideas to be recognised (Duncan, 1974). Why did it take so 
long? As will become clear in the elaboration below, we 
have identified several extra-scientific factors that were 
vital for his recognition and all of them were outside of 
Hägerstrand’s zone of control. Before we turn to this, we 
need to define the concepts of ‘recognition’ and ‘success’ in 
a scientific context.
5. Deconstructing a success story
‘Success’ is not the unilateral achievement of a single 
person’s actions; rather, it represents the product of a multi-
factorial chain of events that must have come together 
in order to warrant broader recognition (Latour, 1987). 
In a science context, STS researchers define the words 
‘success’ and ‘recognition’ as synonymous (cf. Porter, 1978; 
Latour, 1988; Gieryn, 1999). But if we define recognition 
as ‘scientific success’, we also have to define science in 
this regard. Law (2004) defines science as “an activity that 
involves the simultaneous orchestration of a wide range 
of appropriate literature and material arrangements. It 
is about the orchestration of suitable and sustainable 
hinterlands” (Law, 2004, p. 29, italics in the original). In this 
sense, the scientific success and recognition of Hägerstrand 
represents a successful installation within the scientific 
hinterland of Human Geography. A deconstruction of Torsten 
Hägerstrand’s success can now be recounted, in particular 
focusing on community norms (and paradigms) as well as 
material and political factors that allowed its incorporation 
into Human Geography’s hinterland. In order to understand 
the particularities of his recognition, however, we also need 
to establish a timeline for his recognition.
Hägerstrand published his doctoral thesis in 1953 
(Hägerstrand, 1953), laying the conceptual roots that many 
of the biographical accounts of Hägerstrand’s life mention, 
nevertheless it took almost seven more years for him to be 
recognised for them5, becoming part of the then-established 
quantitative revolution (Duncan, 1974). Some biographical 
accounts simply ignore this period. Hägerstrand himself 
treats this period only briefly in his auto-biographical 
reflections (Hägerstrand, 1983) and the majority of other 
accounts attribute it to some form of language barrier, by 
claiming that “many of his publications were in Swedish, 
which delayed the impact he made on research in other 
countries” (Öberg, 2005, p. 341). Thereby, the language 
barrier is treated as an explanation to his belated recognition 
of his contribution. In comparison, we argue that this is a 
simplified historical reconstruction which can be tested 
empirically by turning to works published by Hägerstrand 
and others mentioning him prior to 1960. How many of 
Hägerstrand’s works relating to ideas he eventually became 
recognised for were actually written in English? The 
proposition is that if Hägerstrand’s ideas were available in 
English, the language barrier may not have been the only 
aspect ‘hindering’ his recognition.
It is a fact that his doctoral thesis was published in 
Swedish; however, Hägerstrand spoke fluent English and 
had several international contacts prior to his recognition. 
Furthermore, his thesis was not even ignored – as claimed by 
some biographical accounts (e.g. Öberg, 2005) – as it received 
its first positive English review in 1954 in the prestigious 
Geographical Review (Leighly, 1954, p. 441). Several other 
publications – on the same subject (e.g. Hägerstrand, 1951; 
Hägerstrand, 1952) – were also ‘ignored’ for seven more years 
by the wider geographic community, despite being published 
in English. Once his doctoral thesis was finally translated 
by Pred in 1967 (Hägerstrand, 1967a), Hägerstrand was a 
well-recognised figure and was awarded the Outstanding 
Achievement Award from the Association of American 
Geographers one year later (AAG, 2016)6. This raises the 
question, why was he ignored? The above interpretation of a 
language barrier is not reflected in Hägerstrand’s publication 
or lecturing record. Instead, we suggest that placing this 
recognition in a wider context of the paradigmatic changes 
that happened within Human Geography at the time, offers 
a better explanation. This will be elaborated next.
5.1 Community norms and paradigms
In the case of Hägerstrand, prior to his recognition, he 
made attempts to promote his ideas abroad. He lectured in 
Oslo and Copenhagen in 1954, he visited Edinburgh as a guest 
lecturer in 1957, and he conducted an academic course at 
the University of Munich in the early 1960s. Despite all this, 
his efforts were unsuccessful, even his own senior students 
were “unsympathetic to his ideas” (Duncan, 1974, p. 128). 
Hägerstrand changed the angle in his work on diffusion by 
emphasising his empirical findings rather than his (time 
geographical) methodology. His methodological approach 
broke with convention in that it looked for regularities 
in migration patterns, and made use of computation and 
codification irrespective of locality. Such an approach did not 
fit well into the reigning regional paradigm of contemporary 
Human Geography, which focused primarily on descriptive 
accounts (Hägerstrand, 1983).
The first recognition of his work took place in the winter 
of 1959/60, when Hägerstrand attended a conference 
in Seattle, which by then was a stronghold for the new 
(quantitative) geography (Buttimer, 2007). In those years 
the paradigm changed, it was not Hägerstrand’s ideas 
that changed substantially, but rather Human Geography 
itself. Between 1950 and 1960 Human Geography 
underwent a paradigm shift (Johnston, 1979), which also 
changed how the work of Hägerstrand was subsequently 
viewed (Duncan, 1974; Brauer and Dymitrow, 2017). In 
most countries Geography Departments underwent two 
5 The date of Hägerstrand’s “recognition” cannot be clearly defined: most of the cited accounts assume the publication of his 
doctoral thesis as the locus of his ideas. As such, this publication is treated as a point of “formal” establishment within the 
Human Geography hinterland. The exact point in time of Hägerstrand’s “recognition” cannot be given a specific date either, 
as it was a cumulative process (see Duncan, 1974, pp. 114–120). This is one of the main points of the argument presented here, 
as the incorporation was a complex process requiring several factors to be in place before the “recognition” could occur. We use 
the seven year time span for narrative purposes, as the same biographical accounts regard the 1960 invitation to the Seattle 
conference as a keynote speaker as the ‘official recognition’.
6 From the about-page of ‘Honors of the Association of American Geographers’ (AAG): “1968 – Outstanding Achievement: Torsten 
Hägerstrand and Joseph E. Spencer”.
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substantial changes during this period. Firstly, the discipline 
of Geography split into Human and Physical Geography and 
secondly, there was a shift from the regional paradigm to a 
more quantitative paradigm (Johnston and Claval, 1984). 
Every country underwent its own individual change and the 
dates differ significantly. In United States, in the early 1950s 
the newly formed discipline of Human Geography experienced 
specialisation towards different sub-disciplines, including 
political, economic, historical and urban geography, to 
mention but a few. This dispersal fragmented the previously 
unified regional paradigm, undermining its legitimacy. In 
the mid-1950s, a climate of strong emphasis on positivism 
and more ‘scientific’ methods slowly transformed Human 
Geography, turning it towards quantitative methods that 
have now found their place amidst previous specialisations 
(Johnston and Claval, 1984).
As such, we suggest that Hägerstrand’s recognition and 
‘instalment’ within quantitative geography was only possible 
once this new hinterland had been established. Only after 
new quantitative ideas had disseminated and created their 
own hinterland within the wider body of Human Geography 
knowledge first, then was Hägerstrand’s wider recognition 
possible. As such, Hägerstrand was literally ahead of his time7.
5.2 Material factors
Just as the changes within Human Geography were 
outside the control of Hägerstrand, so were other changes 
taking place at Lund, his home university. This became 
a cornerstone for his recognition, i.e. his work with 
computation. In a 1955 article, Hägerstrand´s hints at 
these benefits reaped from being in physical proximity to 
the academic environment of the University of Lund can 
be identified (Hägerstrand, 1955)8. This becomes even 
more apparent with the establishment of Sweden’s second 
computer in 1956, Siffermaskinen i Lund (SMIL). Bo 
Lenntorp describes this historical contingency by claiming 
“[i]t is the fortunate combinations, constellations that 
facilitate development and change [in science]. SMIL, 
Hägerstrand and Human Geography was one of these” 
(Lenntorp, 2006)9. At that time, computers were gargantuan 
machines requiring significant expertise of the staff to run 
and maintain them (Edwards, 1997). Hägerstrand only 
mentions this pivotal role of computers in passing in one of 
his own biographical accounts:
“… my school-mate since secondary school, Carl-Erik 
Fröberg, who had just come back from a stay in the United 
States […] introduced me to the concept of random 
numbers […] and handed over to me a thin pamphlet on 
the Monte Carlo Method” (Hägerstrand, 1983, p. 248).
Not only did his ‘school-mate’ introduce him to 
mathematical concepts that would define his doctoral 
thesis, Fröberg would also go on to hold the Chair in 
Numerical Analysis at Lund University. The chair 
was especially established for him and SMIL through 
governmental funds, due to the government’s vested 
interest in developing their own computer. Fröberg would 
teach courses in numerical analyses, which Hägerstrand 
attended and their influence can be seen in Hägerstrand’s 
work afterwards (cf. Hägerstrand, 1951; Hägerstrand, 1952; 
Hägerstrand, 1955).
The trip to the United States mentioned above was also 
financed by the Swedish government, in order to evaluate 
the possibilities to build its own computer (Fröberg and 
Sigurd, 1962). The contacts that were established during this 
trip with pioneers of computation like John von Neumann 
were essential in establishing the computer at Lund (Lund 
University, 2011). Hägerstrand is also mentioned as one 
of the applicants of SMIL, arguing for the continued use of 
the computer in a book published by Fröberg (Fröberg and 
Sigurd, 1962). Another positive impact cited in that book was 
the development of the programming language ALGOL 60 in 
order to improve the memory capacities of SMIL. This language 
became eventually a global standard, pushing computer 
development forward (Sperber et al., 2010). The government 
funding for the computer eventually ran its course, which led 
to its shutdown just before 1970. Nevertheless, the prestige 
of having had access to such a high-tech device over several 
years granted legitimacy to his words. Therefore, claims like 
“geographer[s have to] accept the computer as an everyday 
aid” (Hägerstrand, 1967b, p. 3) came from a position of 
authority, undoubtedly aiding his recognition.
In that sense, Hägerstrand undoubtedly benefitted 
substantially from having a computer available to him at 
Lund, the most advanced computer at one point in time (cf. 
Lund University, 2011). His physical proximity to SMIL 
can also be regarded as a materially afforded competitive 
advantage for Hägerstrand´s intellectual development and 
subsequent recognition. Therefore, the material proximity 
afforded by the environment of the computer raised the 
status of Hägerstrand and conceptually influenced his 
work. This contingency made his work accessible and 
trustworthy for dissemination within the quantitative 
hinterland of Human Geography, which eventually led to 
his recognition.
5.3 Political factors
In terms of political factors, which profoundly came 
to shape the career path of Hägerstrand, the connection 
to World War II must be mentioned. One such factor is 
the influence of Edgar Kant, an Estonian professor of 
Economic Geography. Kant introduced Hägerstrand to many 
different points of view, and became his mentor forming 
Hägerstrand’s later views (Öberg, 2005). Kant only migrated 
to Sweden, however, because of the Red Army invasion of his 
native Estonia (Jauhiainen, 2005). Another political factor 
that is connected to World War II is why he was invited 
to the aforementioned conference in Seattle in the first 
place. This conference put him in contact with American 
7 Although Hägerstrand was recognised for his quantitative ideas, his version of time geography always mixed quantitative 
understandings with qualitative reasons. As such, quantitative/qualitative time geography is more a result of institutional 
demarcation rather than Hägerstrand’s own views. For a full description of Hägerstrand’s view on his version of time geography, 
see Hägerstrand, et al., 2009.
8 In a footnote, Hägerstrand mentions that the arguments he put forward within this article were based on his experience with 
a punched card tabulator, which he was allowed to borrow courtesy of Carl-Erik Quensel, a professor of statistics at Lund 
University (Hägerstrand, 1955, p. 240). At that point in time he did not yet have access to a real computer.
9 Translation into English by the authors; original quote in Swedish: ”som vanligt är de lyckosamma kombinationer, 
konstellationerna som skapar utveckling och förändring. SMIL, Hägerstrand och kulturgeografi var en s�dan”, as recorded in a 
lecture given by Bo Lenntorp in celebration of the 50th anniversary of SMIL at the University of Lund, 2006-10-16.
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quantitative geographers, which came to be the beginning 
of Hägerstrand’s wider recognition. They only invited him, 
however, because “USA visas were not granted on political 
grounds for their first two choices – Hans Bobek and Walter 
Christaller – [politically safer was] Torsten from ‘neutral’ 
Sweden” (Buttimer, 2007, p. 140).
Other political factors include Hägerstrand’s involvement 
in planning. Although this was mostly Hägerstrand’s 
secondary field of interest, it helped him in his career. He 
regarded this experience “valuable [to understanding] 
how the transformation of localities and region is bound 
up with events in society at large [… but in general it 
represented a] distraction” from his theoretical interests 
(Hägerstrand, 1983, p. 253). It also left a mark in his use of 
rhetoric as he used this involvement as an argumentative tool. 
For example, he claimed that the benefits of his quantitative 
approach represented a possibility to give insights into the 
time-efficiency of the policies, i.e. a quantitative measure to 
evaluate policies (Hägerstrand, 1967b, p. 18). Furthermore, 
Hägerstrand used examples from projects that he had worked 
on with government funding (e.g. the Öresund Strait project). 
He even used this connection to legitimise his critique of 
theoretical Human Geography in his most famous article 
“What about people in regional science?”, where he asserts 
that geography should serve as an instrument to guide policy 
and planning (Hägerstrand, 1970, p. 1). Once again, we can 
observe that there were factors outside of Hägerstrand’s zone 
of control. These political factors are important in changing 
the outcome of science as they reinforce or undermine a 
certain type of knowledge. In the case of Hägerstrand these 
political factors clearly gave him access to scientific networks 
and created a position of authority, aiding the incorporation 
of his ideas into the newly established quantitative hinterland 
of Human Geography knowledge.
6. “Genius is one percent inspiration,  
ninety-nine percent perspiration”
This famous quote is often attributed to the American 
inventor Thomas Edison. We can observe this tenacity in the 
case of Hägerstrand as well. The obstacles that were in place 
surely must have felt like insurmountable challenges for 
Hägerstrand. For one, Hägerstrand’s quantitative ideas were 
initially unpopular with geographers, and his recognition was 
only possible once the scientific paradigm in geography had 
changed to a more quantitative one, leaving him ‘out dry’ for 
roughly ten years. But he was not without ‘luck’. Hägerstrand 
had a material competitive advantage due to access to 
computers that the Lund environment provided. Also, his 
recognition was aided on account of Sweden’s neutral status 
during WWII: Hägerstrand’s Swedish nationality enabled him 
to acquire the crucial invitation to participate in the seminal 
conference in Seattle. In conclusion, all these extra-scientific 
factors came to influence the dissemination of his ideas and 
concepts into Human Geography’s hinterland. This, however, 
can create the impression that his recognition was primarily 
due to ‘chance’ events, a perspective which sometimes can be 
perceived as blemishing for the contribution of an individual. 
Perhaps this is the reason why some biographical accounts 
omit these aspects. Nothing could be further from the truth, 
however, and Hägerstrand’s involvement in planning best 
exemplifies his tenacity, and surely is worthy of admiration. 
We acknowledge that his tenacity also represents a vital 
contributing factor to his wider recognition, a fact explored 
in the rest of this section, which focuses on Hägerstrand’s 
involvement with spatial planning. Table 1 is an illustration 
of the key life-events that occurred in Hägerstrand’s life, 
which cumulatively led to his recognition, only after these 
were in place, was his incorporation in the Human Geography 
hinterland possible.
Torsten Hägerstrand had a lifelong involvement with 
spatial planning, which fitted well with his quantitative 
ideas and his computational knowledge. In general, 
however, he regarded his involvement in planning merely 
as a “distraction” from his real passion, which was research 
(Hägerstrand, 1983, p. 253). Therefore, to understand 
this involvement it is important to acknowledge that the 
previously mentioned split between Human and Physical 
Geography occurred in Sweden as well. In Sweden, this 
had happened in 1948, changing the discourse of the newly 
established Swedish Human Geography as it adopted a 
more social science focus. Effectively this changed the 
legitimacy of Human Geography as a subject. Swedish 
human geographers were searching for societal relevance 
for their work10. In higher education it went so far that 
Human Geography was in jeopardy of getting its funding 
rescinded. Hägerstrand explains his initial interests in 
planning in following terms:
“Since geographers had an uncertain future on higher 
levels in the school system we were several university 
geographers who felt it is our obligation to try to 
open a new labour market for our advanced students” 
(Hägerstrand, 1983, p. 252).
10 Other countries had their own versions of this existential conflict (see Johnston and Claval, 1984)
Tab. 1. Key events in the life of Torsten Hägerstrand
Note: Events that are spread out over time are not 
included within this illustration of key events (e.g. the 
establishment of the Lund School of Geography starting 
in the late 1950s and spanning to the end of the 1960s). 
Sources: Duncan, 1974; Hägerstrand, 1983; Sollbe, 1991; 
Buttimer, 2007; Persson and Elleg�rd, 2012
1916 Born in Moheda (Sweden)
c. 1932 Start of friendship with Carl-Erik Fröberg
1937 Enrolled at Lund University 
1953 Publication of his PhD thesis, Lund
1954 Lectured in Oslo and Copenhagen  
1956 Establishment of SMIL at Lund University 
1957 Guest lecturer at the University of Edinburgh
1959/60 Seattle conference
1966 Grant of 1.1 million SEK for regional studies
1968 Received an Outstanding Achievement Award from 
the Association of American Geographers  
1970 Publication of ‘What about people in Regional Science?’
1979 Received Victoria Medal from the Royal Geographical 
Society 
1992 Awarded Lauréat Prix International de Géographie 
Vautrin Lud (Vautrin Lud Prize)
2004 Died in Lund 
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The labour market he refers to denotes the involvement 
of geographers in public planning. In this way, the new 
quantitative paradigm was very welcome in that it clearly 
separated the ‘scientific’ subject of Human Geography from 
‘common knowledge’. Before the new labour market could 
be opened, however, Hägerstrand had to make geographical 
education relevant for the public planning context. This 
effort eventually led to geographers securing the labour 
market, whereupon geography was made relevant and 
enabled Hägerstrand’s involvement in the early planning 
stages of the Öresund Strait project. This tenacity helped 
to secure the position of Human Geography as an academic 
subject at Swedish universities.
Hägerstrand’s tenacity paid off doubly, as all these 
efforts allowed him to secure research grants from various 
government departments. One grant of 1.1 million SEK 
represented the biggest single research grant in Sweden up 
to that date, for any social science research (Sollbe, 1991). 
This money was also used to support Hägerstrand’s 
research, as it paid for seminars and publications, which 
later allowed him to establish a platform for his ideas. 
This and other research grants allowed the Department 
of Geography at Lund University to pay the researcher’s 
adequate wages and stop their “brain drain” (Öberg, 2005, 
p. 342). Furthermore, it aided with the funding of journals, 
financing seminars and travel expenditures, creating 
scholarships to send researchers abroad and monetary 
incentives for scholars to come to Lund – i.e. providing 
monetary resources to create and finance the so-called 
‘Lund School of geographical thought’ (Buttimer and 
Mels, 2006). This, among other things, allowed Hägerstrand 
to enter the epistemic community of quantitative 
geography (Hägerstrand, 1983). In fact, this represents 
the particular network structure that became vital in 
Hägerstrand’s international recognition and subsequent 
success (Duncan, 1974).
As stated previously, Hägerstrand faced rejection in 
his early years. We argued that the concurrent paradigm 
shift within Human Geography offers a better explanation 
for his ‘belated’ recognition. Viewed in this light, it is 
somewhat ironic that his efforts devoted to the ‘distraction’ 
(his involvement in planning) eventually aided his main 
passion (research). As such, our analysis highlights another 
central ‘extra-scientific’ factor, i.e. the character of Torsten 
Hägerstrand. Much has been written about his character 
in the biographical accounts; nevertheless the tenacity he 
manifested is the last ‘factor’ we would like to stress as 
being vital for his recognition. This is exemplified through 
his involvement in planning. The research also points to 
other, more personal, aspects that were important for his 
success, such as his wife “being a lifelong unpaid research 
assistant” (Hägerstrand, as cited in Sollbe, 1991), the 
psychological effect of his son committing suicide, or his 
Swedish ethnicity. Although all of these factors represent 
potential fruitful avenues for future inquiries, for the sake 
of brevity and clarity of argument, they have been omitted 
in this paper.
7. Community norms, materiality and politics 
… some concluding remarks
Each scientific discipline has its own set of tools – 
ontological, epistemological and methodological – which 
form a hinterland of concepts and ideas that define that 
very discipline’s ‘identity’. Human Geography is not an 
exemption in this respect. Although new concepts and 
ideas are constantly introduced and fall out of favour, 
respectively, their success or demise depends not only 
on internal but also on external factors as well as the 
‘qualities’ of the people involved. Hägerstrand claimed as 
much himself, when he stated that “[i]deas do not succeed 
one another in de-natured space; rather they grow out 
from roots in progressively changing life experiences” 
(Hägerstrand, 1983, p. 9). We have identified three extra-
scientific factors that correspond to these ‘natured spaces’ 
within Human Geography – community norms, materiality 
and politics – which all starkly influenced the dissemination 
of Torsten Hägerstrand’s ideas.
At this point, a note on Human Geography within the 
context of our analysis is necessary. Being more diverse than 
any other of the traditional disciplines, Human Geography 
represents a specific case of knowledge production. Its 
diversity – in the sense that ‘old practices are not completely 
replaced by newer ones’ (cf. Sheppard, 1995) – creates 
‘niches’ for diametrically opposing epistemologies under 
the banner of one discipline (cf. Barnes, 2001). Since these 
niches (i.e. hinterlands) have to be established in the first 
place, however, there is not just one Human Geographical 
hinterland, but several, and they are constantly changing 
and evolving (cf. Johnston, 2008). While this certainly 
makes Human Geography particularly susceptible to 
alterations on account of competing epistemic practices, 
the underlying hows and whys often become blurred or 
even completely omitted from analysis. Effectively, such 
accounts create a deceptive image of a linear knowledge 
production within Human Geography, whereas much of it 
is actually purely circumstantial, incidental or provisional. 
When assessing the quality of geographical knowledge 
and especially its state-of-the-art, these factors should 
unconditionally be taken into consideration.
Despite Human Geography’s diversity, the mechanisms 
behind its recognition function are similar to those of other 
scientific disciplines. While these types of external factors 
are well-documented within the natural sciences, the social 
sciences have not been scrutinised to a similar extent. As we 
can observe, research, scientific success and recognition have 
material and sociological contingencies within the particular 
contexts of their creation. Therefore, the assumption 
that all scientific disciplines function sociologically in 
a similar way despite some apparent differences (cf. 
Camic et al., 2012; Dymitrow and Brauer, 2017), seems 
justified. While academic success is usually considered 
the intellectual achievement of the individual researcher, 
we tend to forget about the externalities that contribute 
greatly to knowledge production. We agree with Annemarie 
Mol (2002) that it is these types of norms, materialities 
and socio-economic conditions that in practice escape the 
relativism of representation.
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